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REFORMING JUDICIAL REFORM
INSPIRED BY U.S. MODELS
Hiram E. Chodosh*
INTRODUCTION
This Article advances three critical observations. First, there is a
growing gap between the substantive legal commitments to justice re-
form and the persistent failures of judicial systems to satisfy fre-
quently articulated rule-of-law objectives. Second, the internal
barriers to reform are so high that purely external remedies, including
those based on U.S. models, are unlikely to succeed. Third, in order
to improve the success rate of foreign judicial reform initiatives, the
mechanisms, methods, designs, and embedded theories of external
support for judicial reform require greater explication, comparative
evaluation, and calibrated adaptation to meet the internal needs of
reforming communities.
II. SUBSTANTIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL TRENDS
A. Global Trends in Substantive Reform
Many national legal systems have made sweeping commitments to
three areas of substantive political and economic reform. First, tradi-
tionally authoritarian political systems have sought to achieve greater
democracy through popular elections, more accountable and transpar-
ent governance, and the effectuation of domestic human rights protec-
tions. Second, governments have loosened their grips on economic
systems., embraced a freer marketplace, and recognized a broader
range of real and intellectual property rights. Third, the international
community has embarked on a nearly uncontrollable and irreversible
process of globalization. Unprecedented daily flows of capital, tech-
nology, goods, services, information, and people currently permeate
national borders.
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In pursuit of these commitments (democracy and human rights;
free, knowledge-based economies; and globalization and the reduction
of cross-national barriers), countries have generated a daunting quan-
tity of new substantive law including civil, commercial, and criminal
codes, constitutional reforms, and treaties in support of new economic
unions and an emerging international criminal justice system.
B. The Institutional Rule of Law Challenge
The fulfillment of these legal commitments poses a formidable insti-
tutional challenge. The realization of the right to vote, the enforce-
ment of contract, the protection of property and human dignity, and
the ability to trade with other societies without predatory tariffs or
unfair treatment all require institutional adherence to the rule of law.1
It is a noted paradox of the rule of law, however, that states must be
simultaneously strong and self-limiting.2 The potentially paralytic ef-
fects of this paradox dissipate with a focus on the judiciary, or some
functional equivalent, as not only the least dangerous 3 institution, but
also the one best able to serve this dual function of strong enforce-
ment and self-limitation. Impartial and effective adjudicative or dis-
pute resolution institutions, help effectuate the rule of law.4
The courts and supporting public and private institutions are there-
fore critical to the realization of widely shared twenty-first century
objectives.5 From this perspective, judicial institutions may hold the
1. See AXEL HADENIUS, INSTITUTIONS AND DEMOCRATIC CITIZENSHIP 97 (2001) (stating that
democracy "is stimulated too by the existence of institutional structures based on administrative
order and the rule of law, and by the separation of powers. ... )
2. See Jeffrey D. Sachs. Globalization and the Rule of Law (Yale L. Sch., New Haven, Conn..
1998), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/outside/html/Publications/pub-sachs.htm (last visited
Sept. 3, 2002).
3. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS (2d ed. 1986).
4. See. e.g., EDOARDO BUSCAGLIA, JR. ET AL., JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA: A
FRAMEWORK FOR NATIIONAL DEVELOPMENT 1 (Hoover Inst.. Essays in Pub. Pol'y No. 65, 1995)
(stating that "[e]ven the best legislation is meaningless without an effective judicial system to
enforce it"); JUSTICE DELAYED: JUDICIAL REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA chs. 8-11 (Edmundo Jar-
qufn & Fernando Carillo eds.. 1998) [hereinafter JUSTICE DELAYED] (relating the importance of
judicial institutions to economic performance. property rights, civil society, and
democratization).
5. See, e.g., Andros Rigo Sureda & Waleed Haider Malik. Judicial Challenges in the New Mil-
lenium. in JUDICIAL CHALLENGES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND
SUMMIT OF THE IBERO-AMERICAN SUPRFME COURTS AND TRIBUNALS OF JUSTICE 3 (Andres
Rigo Sureda & Waleed Haider Malik eds., World Bank Technical Paper No. 450. 1999) [herein-
after JUDICIAL CHALLENGES IN THE NEW MILLENiUM], available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org (last visited Sept. 3, 2002) (reflecting upon "'common understanding that the
twenty-first century will be a knowledge century" and awareness that "a proactive role of the
judiciary is essential in leading change and adapting to new realities") (emphasis in original).
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greatest promise of providing an effective check on political, eco-
nomic, and legal threats to the emergence of a democratic, prosper-
ous, and law-based global society.6 Through impartial judgment, no
branch of government is better designed to hold political and eco-
nomic actors accountable to law or to ensure that commercial and
property rights and obligations are enforced. To perform this role,
however, courts must be independent from undue political interfer-
ence, maintain integrity in the face of private financial pressures, and
operate at a high level of efficiency, especially given frequently inade-
quate human and financial resources. As Amartya Sen has empha-
sized in a broader context, "Our opportunities and prospects depend
crucially on what institutions exist and how they function. '' 7
C. Persistent Failures in Institutional Performance
The least dangerous branch of government is, sadly, also the most
neglected. Courts are fragile political institutions, and their effective-
ness is easily undermined by more resilient political, economic, and
cultural forces. Judiciaries are underfunded, undersupported, under-
trained, and underprotected. 8 National judicial systems have not been
able to keep pace with substantive commitments to democracy, free
markets, and globalization. Political and economic interference9 com-
bined with impartiality and delay in the administration of justice 10 cur-
rently undermine the achievement of core objectives in many
6. See WILLIAM C. PRILLAMAN. THE JUDICIARY AND DEMOCRATIC DECAY IN LATIN
AMERICA: DECLINING CONFIDENCE IN THE RULE OF LAW 1 (2000) (stating that "a strong judici-
ary is essential for checking potential executive and legislative breaches of the constitutional
order, laying the foundations for sustainable economic development, and building popular sup-
port for the democratic regime").
7. AMARTYA SEN. DEVELOPMENT As FREEDOM 142 (1999).
8. For an incisive treatment of these problems in Peru and Latin America more generally, see
LINN ANN HAMMERGREN. THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE AND JUSTICE REFORM IN LATIN AMERICA:
TI PE-RUJVIAN CASF IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 6 (1998) (stating that "[i]t is conventional
wisdom among Latin Americans that their judiciaries and indeed their entire justice systems are
the orphan branch of government, underfinanced, bypassed by modernization, and politically
dominated by the executive and legislature or by various governmental and nongovernmental
elites"). See also JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., BRIBES (1984): JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.. CORRUPTION
AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Kimberly Ann Elliot ed., 1996): JOHN T. NOONAN. JR.. CORRUP
lION AND DEVELOPMENT (Mark Robinson ed., 1998).
9. Robert E. Klitgaard, International Cooperation Against Corruption, FIN. & DEV., Mar.
1998, at 3. available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/1998/03/pdf/klitgaar.pdf (last
visited Sept. 3, 2002); ROBERT E. KLITGAARD. CONTROLLING CORRUPTION (1988): Susan Rose-
Ackerman, Redesigning the State to Fight Corruption: Transparency, Competition, and Privatiza-
tion. PUB. POL+Y FOR PRIVATE SECTOR (Viewpoint Note No. 75. Apr. 1996). available at http://
www.worldbank.org/html/fpd/notes/75/75ackerm.pdf (last visited Sept. 3. 2002): SUSAN ROSE-
ACKERMAN. CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAiJSES. CONSEOUENCES AND REFORM (1999).
10. See. e.g., JUSTICE DFLAYED. supra note 4.
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countries throughout the world.' Indeed, an excessively partial or
slow process renders fundamental public legal principles ineffectual,
eviscerates private legal rights and obligations, cultivates the condi-
tions for corruption,' 2 and favors the powerful over the weak. Institu-
tional dysfunction thus undermines equality under the law and
corrodes the incentives critical to legal compliance.
Ironically, the new demands on courts appear to intensify their inef-
fectiveness. As courts become more important, the political urge to
influence them also grows. Despite the strong rhetorical commit-
ments to independence, integrity, and efficiency, severe problems
fester.13
Illegal influence remains common. 14 In Indonesia, for example, the
Supreme Court remains vulnerable to political intimidation, threats of
violence, and enticingly large bribes.' 5 In Tanzania, bribes of lay as-
sessors, who are paid the equivalent of $0.45 per sitting, are consid-
ered necessary to advance or defend claims successfully.' 6 In surveys
conducted in Bangladesh, 63.6% of the respondents indicated that
they had bribed judicial officials (73.1% in cash, 53.3% paying their
bribes in person): almost 90% said that it was almost impossible to get
11. See, e.g.. MARIA DAKOLIAS. THE JUDICIAL SECTOR IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIB-
BEAN: ELEMENTS OF REFORM (World Bank Technical Paper No. 319, 1996) (documenting the
extent to which public institutions in the region have not been able to respond effectively to the
challenges of markets, with the courts "experiencing lengthy case delays, extensive case
backlogs, limited access by the population, a lack of transparency and predictability in court
decisions and weak public confidence in the judicial system").
12. BUSCAGLIA ET AL., supra note 4. at 8.
13. See. e.g., MARK UNGAR, ELUSIVE REFORM: DEMOCRACY AND THE RULE OF LAW IN
LATIN AMERICA 119-68 (2002) (discussing the absence of judicial independence in Latin
America): JUAN E. MENDEZ, THE (UN)RULE OF LAW AND THE UNDERPRIVILEGED IN LATIN
AMERICA 227-337 (1999) (discussing institutional reform and access to justice).
14. See, e.g.. EDGARDo BUSCAGLIA. JUDICIAL CORRUPTION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: ITS
CAUSES AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES (Berkley Olin Program in Law & Econ.. Working Pa-
per No. 28. 1999). available at http://repositories.cdlib.org/blewp/28/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2002).
15. Hiram E. Chodosh, Indonesia. in LEGAL SYSTEMS OF THE WORLD: A POLITICAL, SOCIAL.
AND CULTURAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 705-10 (2002).
16. HIRAM E. CHODOSH & STEPHEN A. MAYO, INST. FOR STUDY & DEV. OF LEG. SYS..
TANZANIAN LEGAL STUDY 709 (Phase Two Report 2002). See also R.N. Ben Lobulu, Corrup-
tion and the Administration of Justice, in THE NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEM IN TANZANIA: PRO-
CEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP CONVENED BY THE PREVENTION OF CORRUPION BUREAU,
TANZANIA 89. 91 (1995) ("Corruption in law courts is no longer the cottage industry it used to
be: it has grown by leaps and bounds and has matured into one of the commanding heights of the
economy. It is a thriving business."): Tanzanian President Urges Jdges Off Corruption, XINHUA
NEWS AGENCY. Nov. 7. 2001 (reporting that President Mkapa called for "advocates with knowl-
edge of the laws of the land rather than those who 'know judges and magistrates through corrupt
means'').
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a quick and fair judgment without monetary influence. 7 In sum, the
law that proscribes corruption has profoundly limited effects' 8 on the
market incentives for bribery.' 9
Additionally, the growing importance of recently implemented law
has also imposed new burdens on courts. New rights create new forms
of legally cognizable claims and disputes. In most market oriented or
democratic countries, case filings are on the rise; yet, most countries
are not close to keeping pace.20
As one extreme manifestation of this common problem, Indian
courts are falling further behind with each passing year. For example,
in Ahmedabad, a city of approximately four million people in the
state of Gujarat, the city's civil courts receive approximately eight
thousand cases and resolve only two thousand, leaving the remainder
for subsequent years of court work or eventual abandonment by the
parties. In September 2000, when I last visited the civil court in that
city, the fourteen judges assigned to civil matters (beyond small
causes) for the entire city were hearing cases filed between 1986 and
1990.21 In three Latin American countries (Argentina, Ecuador, and
Venezuela), from 1981 to 1993, disposition times increased by 85% in
part because of economic changes. 22 In Russia, between 1987 and
17. Mansoor Hasan, Corruption in Bangladesh Surveys: An Overview, at http://www.ti-ban-
gladesh.org/survey/overview.htm (last visited Sept. 3, 2002). See also Maria Dakolias & Kim
Thachuk, Attacking Corruption in the Judiciary: A Critical Process in Judicial Reform. 18 Wis.
INT'L L.J. 353, 366-67 (2000) (reporting that polls in Latin America indicate comparably high
perceptions of corruption: in Argentina. 57% see corruption as a main problem: in Honduras.
three out of every four polled see the judiciary as corrupt: and in Costa Rica, 54% believe that
external pressures affect judicial decisions).
18. See Transparency International Releases New Bribe Payers Index (BP1) 2002, available at
http://www.transparency.org/pressreleases-archive/2002/2002.05.14.bpi.en.html (last visited Sept.
3, 2002) (stressing the ineffectuality of domestic and international law: "The BPI shows that US
multinational corporations. which have faced the risk of criminal prosecution since 1977 under
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, have a high propensity to pay bribes to foreign government
officials," and "[t]he BPI results signal the rejection by multinational firms of the spirit of inter-
national anti-bribery conventions").
19. See generally PETER H. SCHUCK. THE LiMITs OF LAW 434-44 (2000) (discussing interaction
between law, social norms, and markets).
20. See MARIA DAKOLIAS. COURT PERFORMANCE AROUND THE WORLD: A COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE (World Bank Technical Paper No. 430, 1999).
21. HIRAM E. CHODOSH & STEPHEN A. MAYO, INsT. FOR SiUy & DEV. OF LE(. Sys.. THE
AHMEDABAD MEDIATION PROJECT (2000) (on file with author).
22. BUSCAGLIA ET AL.. supra note 4. at 10 (stating that "the frustrations of backlogs . . .as
well as litigants' desires to get their cases heard and won, provide the opportunities for the courts
to extract rents"). See also TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE
JUDICIARY (Irwin P. Stotzky ed., 1993): MARTHA A. FIELD & WILLIAM W. FISHER. Ill, LEGAL
REFORM IN CENTRAL AMERICA: DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND PROPERTY SYSTEMS 14-20 (2001)
(illustrating the "gross inefficiency that is produced by maintenance of the traditional system in
today's society and economy").
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1997, the number of civil cases in the courts doubled from 1,839,000 to
3,916,839, and "the judiciary has been overwhelmed by a new demand
for its services. ' 23 Delay is not limited to developing countries. Sys-
tems ranging from England to Italy are struggling to combat delay as
well. 24
D. Systemic Causes in Poor Performance
The causes of this common failure are deeply systemic. Two brief
examples illustrate the number of factors that may contribute to court
failure.
In Indonesia, for example, political and private interference are at-
tributable to three major factors: strong incentives, weak disincen-
tives, and ample opportunity. Weak terms of judicial employment
including low salaries, politicized appointment, transfer and promo-
tion systems, insecure terms of office or tenure, and limited forms of
economic and personal security increase the need to seek illegal mon-
etary payments and to avoid political affronts. Frequently, the disin-
centives are equally weak. Vague ethical norms, poor monitoring
capacity, corrupted review systems, and ineffectual prosecution and
enforcement substantially reduce the risk of illicit behavior.25 Oppor-
tunities for corruption remain unchecked by an opaque procedural
system of limited joint communication, reason-giving or publicity, a
slow and fragmented process with multiple steps and appeals, a poorly
regulated and fragmented body of legal professionals, and a state mo-
nopoly on the resolution of legal disputes that puts too much discre-
tion in too few hands.26
In India, as another example, backlog and delay derive from a lack
of accountability, discipline, versatility, and finality. Court adminis-
tration systems lose track of matters, events, records, and evidence.
Case processing is discontinuous, fragmented, protracted, and exces-
sively permissive of adjournments, provisional ex parte procedures,
and appeals. Settlements are rare, and few alternatives to trial are
available or well-developed. Litigation is still viewed as the primary
23. PETER H. SOLOMON. JR. & TODD S. FOGLESONc. COURTS AND TRANSITION IN RUSSIA:
THE CHALLENGE OF JUDICIAL REFORM 114-15 (2000).
24. Adrian A.S. Zuckerman, Justice in Crisis: Comparative Dimensions of Civil Procedure, in
CIVIL JUSTICE IN CRISIS: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 3,23 (Adrian A.S.
Zuckerman et al. eds., 1999) (noting that in Italy, for example. "it is not uncommon for plaintiffs
to be forced to wait 10 years for final judgment").
25. Judge J. Clifford Wallace, Resolving Judicial Corruption While Preserving Judicial Inde-
pendence: Comparative Perspectives. 28 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 341. 346-48 (1998) (discussing the
diversity of approaches used in Asian judicial systems to discipline judges).
26. Chodosh, supra note 15, at 708-09.
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means of dispute settlement, not to mention dispute escalation. Final-
ity is elusive, as appellate rights are excessively permissive. Cases lin-
ger beyond the life-span of the original parties, thus triggering the
need for additional hearings to satisfy notice and process require-
ments for new rights-holders directly affected by the judgment. Provi-
sional and post-judgment remedies for failure to comply with final
judgments are additionally inadequate to deter noncompliance. 27
E. Lessons
In sum, there is a significant difference between the expectation and
actual performance of judicial institutions, 28 and the gap may be grow-
ing as a result of quick normative and slow institutional change. With-
out responsive ways of bridging this gap, judicial systems will be
trapped in an endless pendulum swing from high hope to bitter disap-
pointment. To avoid this trap, two lessons from the foregoing discus-
sion must be kept in mind.
First, without adequate investments in institutional development of
the courts or other supporting institutions (e.g., judicial councils,
ombudsmen, or mediation centers), the legal commitments that set in
motion a process of democratization, privatization, and globalization
may make matters only worse, at least in the short term. Law takes
on greater importance; legally-cognizable claims increase; more peo-
ple come to the courts expecting justice; and stakes in the outcome
rise. The only phenomenon that flattens this higher demand is a con-
tinued failure of the judicial system: if litigants distrust the system or
find it ineffective, they will pursue private, extralegal strategies or sim-
ply lump their legal injuries and internalize the costs. 29
Second, substantive commitments are easier to achieve than institu-
tional reforms. Common assumptions of perfect enforcement or uni-
form imperfections in enforcement trivialize the importance of
primary agents in the legal process, whose individual incentives pro-
duce different systemic behavior and outcomes. 3' Developing institu-
27. Hiram E. Chodosh et al., Indian Civil Justice System Reform: Limitation and Preservation
of the Adversarial Process. 30 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1998).
28. Many others have made similar observations. See. e.g.. PRILLAMAN. supra. note 6, at 2
(noting a "deep and widening gap between the role that institutions theoretically serve in a
democracy and that which they actually perform").
29. For example. a recent World Bank study in Argentina and Mexico found far less backlog
and delay than previously estimated, due to a great number of cases eventually "abandoned."
See LINN HAMMEROREN, REFORMING COURTS: THE ROLE OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH. (World
Bank Prelim. Notes. No. 65, Mar. 2002). available at http://wwwl.worldbank.org/prem/
PREMNotes/premnote65.pdf (last visited Sept. 3. 2002).
30. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS. INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE ANi ECONOMIC PER-
FORMANCE 54 (1991).
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tional performance means changing behaviors that are difficult to
affect without structural changes in these incentive structures (and the
feedback systems by which agents react to these changes and
opportunities)-.31
What then are the internal and external capabilities for closing this
gap between substantive commitments and institutional performance?
III. INTERNAL BARRIERS TO REFORM
Before evaluating the ability of external agents to reform judicial
institutions, it is necessary to assess the internal barriers to reform. 32
As a complement to Bryant Garth's leading exposition of these struc-
tural barriers, 33 this section sketches a wide array of systemic impedi-
ments and inhospitable reform conditions.
A. Systemic Impediments
1. Empathetic Accounts
Particularly from an external perspective, reformers can easily fail
to see the functional justifications for phenomena they criticize. For
example, anti-independence measures may emerge to regulate an en-
tirely venal judiciary.34 Corruption may flourish as a response to the
inefficiencies of a tenured civil service and an invasive and excessively
bureaucratic regulatory system. Delay may be a sign of the system
working hard to achieve factual accuracy and substantive justice with-
out cutting corners. Adjournment cultures may develop because it is
difficult to get to court on time when one has to travel great distances
and notification systems are poor.35 For example, British colonial au-
thorities in Tanzania wrongly attributed delays to incompetence rather
31. See id. at 7.
32. See, e.g., Daniel Craig, Tradition and Reform in an Iranian Village, in I ACCESS -1-0 JUSTICE
147-70 (Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth eds.. 1978) (noting that many states have been un-
successful in their efforts to reshape the traditional social and legal system of their rural popula-
tion, and explaining the structural factors that impeded the Shah's efforts to supplant the feudal
system with a democratically elected court with formal procedures).
33. In addition to his contribution in this symposium, see Bryant G. Garth. Rethinking the
Processes and Criteria for Success, in COMPREHENSIVE LEGAL AND JUDICIAi DEVELOPMENT:
TOWARD AN AGENDA FOR A JUST AND EQUIrTABLE SOCIETY IN THE 21si CENTURY 16-21 (Ru-
dolph V. Van Puymbroeck ed., 2001) (identifying structural complications for the importing and
exporting of the rule of law: the long histories of legal institutions: unique aspects of the U.S.
model: the relative lack of legal autonomy in host systems and the influence of local contexts
and struggles for prestige and power).
34. See MARY L. VOLCANSEK & JACQUELINE LUCIENNE LAFON. JUDICIAL SELECTION: THE
CRoss-EVOLUTION OF FRENCH AND AMERICAN PRACIiCES (1988).
35. See Chodosh et al., supra note 27, at 37-38 n.117.
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than to the economic conditions of rural life. 36 As reflected in the
Chagga saying: "[I]t is no use claiming a cow from a man who does not
have one," 37 claimants may reasonably wait to prosecute a claim "un-
til the original debtor's son or grandson prospers. '38
Beyond these points, however, there are less empathetic accounts of
the deep impediments to reform.
2. Powerful Interests
Problems persist in part because they serve the interests of powerful
politicians, monopolists, and professional elites (including lawyers
themselves). 39 Political leaders rarely appreciate the benefits of limits
on their own power. Rich families and corporations may prefer to
purchase justice rather than subjecting themselves to impartial deci-
sion-making. Lawyers paid by the number of court appearances have
strong incentives to protract litigation into a series of fragmented, dis-
continuous proceedings, and those paid substantial amounts upfront
have little reason to push matters forward. Therefore, reforms meet
substantial resistance from those who benefit from the status quo.
Shortsighted analyses of the ostensibly apolitical nature of court re-
form, 4t coupled with excessive optimism to affect change, are likely to
result in deep disappointment. 41
3. Mutual Reinforcement
Problems of failed performance tend to reinforce one another.
Poor terms of employment make judges more vulnerable to corrup-
tion and less likely to combat delay with sufficient industry. Political
interference and delay are also conducive to corruption because these
conditions give administrators (e.g., from the Ministry of Justice to the
court registrar) the ability to extract rents for altering outcomes or
pushing matters forward or back. If judges are corrupt, the legitimacy
and integrity necessary to give them more independence is lacking,
and the incentives to create delay increase.
36. Sally Falk Moore, Treating Law as Knowledge: Telling Colonial Officers What to Sa' to
Africans about Running "Their Own" Native Courts. 26 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 11, 29 (1992).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See HERNAND_ DE Soio, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL WHY CAIJIFALISM TRiUMi'iHs IN
THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 198 (2000) (noting that "most lawyers in developing
and former communist countries have been trained not to expand the rule of law but to defend it
as they found it").
40. DAKOLIAS. supra note 20. at 6 (stating that "efficiency is a promising starting point for the
study and design of judicial reform because of its relatively apolitical nature").
41. See HAMMERGREN, supra note 8. at 297.
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4. Limited Resources
These problems have an adverse effect on the human and financial
resources a judicial system can attract through either the public or
private sector.42 Human resource deficiencies are critical. Lawyers in
many societies are still at a relatively low rung of professional rank-
ings, and legal educators struggle to attract talented students. This is
changing in many dysfunctional systems, particularly those transition-
ing to a new market system; however, the talented students attracted
to law, in Russia for example, are interested in transactional settings
far removed from the practical operation of the courts. Judicial posi-
tions are far less desirable than one would presume in a U.S. context.
An important form of psychic income is unavailable to judges in sys-
tems that allot them weaker civil service roles.
Even if one could solve these recruitment problems, limited finan-
cial resources pose an additional impediment. Experts bemoan the
low level of public financing in the courts; however, beyond inten-
tional neglect, political institutions may be reluctant to invest in insti-
tutions that function so partially or poorly. Lawyers in these systems
complain about the way they struggle to make a living, and judges
observe that their salaries are substantially lower than those of the
bar. However, it is unlikely that a legislature or clientele would re-
ward a judiciary or bar when there is very little perceived social value
rendered by their services. Again, these vexing problems cannot be
understood outside of their systemic context and the functional moti-
vations of different participants.
In a vicious cycle of positive feedback (rendering negative effects),
solving one problem seems to require solving them all simultaneously.
Yet, solving them all seems entirely impossible because the conditions
on the ground are not conducive to reform.
B. Inhospitable Reform Conditions
Several additional conditions are deeply inhospitable to effective
reform.
1. Low Level of Local Participation
The improved performance of a judicial system ultimately is a mat-
ter for the reforming community. Short of full occupation and micro-
management by a foreign power or international institution, external
pressure and assistance are limited in their effect on local behaviors of
42. NORTH. supra note 30. at 61 (stating that "it takes resources to define and protect property
rights and to enforce agreements").
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a judicial system. The failure to involve local actors in the reform pro-
cess can easily lead to reactionary viewpoints and recalcitrant behav-
iors. Furthermore, the communities most in need of effective reform
tend to have the lowest levels of participation in the reform process.
2. Limited Self-Awareness
Reform proposals based on inaccurate self-assessments are not
likely to have a positive impact in addressing critically important
problems. This is particularly true in systems where there is a large
deviation between law and practice. Self-awareness depends on can-
dor, quantitative empirical tools, and qualitative assessments. Unfor-
tunately, powerful interests may repress candid assessments, and very
few reforming communities have an adequate set of empirical tools;
even where both are available, most quantitative analysis is often defi-
cient in a qualitative assessment of what value the judicial system
should produce and at what cost.43
3. Isolation from Worldwide Models
Broad exposure to other models liberates contemporary thinking,
punctures local dogmas, and liberates reformers to think beyond
overly-simplistic models of alternative judicial institutions and
processes. In-depth exposure to other systems also provides legal re-
formers with a comprehensive checklist of detailed considerations to
be addressed in a sustainable reform initiative. Many legal communi-
ties, however, have been severely isolated and have little awareness of
other models. Still others are closed to the idea of drawing on the
experience of all but a few nations with whom they identify (such as
the United States, former colonial powers with whom origins are
shared, or neighboring countries with similar value systems or levels
of development). 44 The common isolation or narrow focus of legal
communities produces a parochial perspective that limits the range of
conceivable remedies.
43. See, e.g., SIMEON DJANKOV ET AL., CouRiS: THE LEX MUNDI PROJECT (1951 Harvard
Institute of Economic Research Mar. 2002). available at http:/post.economics.harvard.edu/hier/
papers/2002list.html (last visited Sept. 3, 2002) (treating efficiency as the mere absence of delay).
44. Ironies abound. Take. for example. the continued primary interest of Indonesians in
Dutch reforms, or the disturbing realization that a group of reformers from Pakistan have to rely
on U.S. expertise in India to answer questions about the structure, process. and impacts of the
lok adalat (People's Court) system in neighboring India.
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4. Limited Creativity in Adapted Design
Exposure to foreign systems is helpful but seldom sufficient for ef-
fective reform design. Reform models are more likely to succeed if
they are not merely copied or transplanted into the system. The argu-
ment that transplants are easy and common, although based on sub-
stantial historical evidence, profoundly undervalues the relationship
between law and external social objectives.45 Furthermore, reforms
conceived as blunt negations of the status quo are not likely to be
successful. 46 Reform proposals based on foreign systems or in reac-
tion to recent domestic experience require careful adaptation. Most
communities, however, are not familiar with the tools of adaptation
and tend to think of foreign models as package deals to accept or re-
ject, but rarely to alter, and alterations tend to graft one institution
onto another without comprehensive consideration of the system as a
whole. 47
5. Shaky Ground for Consensus-Building
As Linn Hammergren explained, "Justice reform also implies politi-
cal change in its broadest sense. '48 Reform, therefore, depends on a
political strategy that can overcome the powerful forces in support of
the status quo. However, few experts in judicial systems have the so-
phistication to develop a political strategy, and reformers thus have
difficulty aligning political leadership at the top with the demand for
change at the street level.
6. Additional Factors
Several additional conditions affect the ability to develop and apply
an effective implementation strategy. These factors include the follow-
ing: inexperience with strategic planning and implementation; the fi-
45. Watson. for example. took the position that "many legal rules make little impact on indi-
viduals. and that very often it is important that there be a rule: but what rule actually is adopted
is of restricted significance for general human happiness." ALAN WATSON, LEOAL TRANS-
PLANTS: AN APPROACH TO COMPARATIVE LAW 96 (2d ed. 1993).
46. Deprived and demoralized constituencies also have an understandable propensity to make
purely self-interested proposals rather than to justify or reject reforms based on what benefits
they provide to the broader society. Rigorous facilitation to redirect their thinking toward the
functional goals of the judicial system is therefore frequently required,
47. Donald L. Horowitz Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes, in THE ARCHI
TECTURE OF DEMOCRACY: CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN, CONFLICT MANAGEMENT, AND DEMOC-
RACY 15, 17 (Andrew Reynolds ed., 2002) (stating that "[d]espite international consultations
many countries produce constitutions that are more or less impervious to whatever international
wisdom has purveyed or. for that matter, to what a careful examination of comparative experi-
ence might reveal").
48. HAMMERGREN. supra note 8. at 31.
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nancial needs of the reforming legal system for outside support and
the demands of the donor community for internal action; and personal
and professional security concerns for those engaged in reform.
First, communities that have not had the opportunity to determine
the design of their own legal system have a comparative disadvantage
in reform. Legal cultures49 accustomed to exclusively top-down re-
form tend to be passive in developing their own views and complacent
in holding authorities accountable to plans for implementation. Fur-
thermore, actors who benefit from a system hindered by institutional-
ized corruption or protracted delays are likely to feel threatened by
reforms and their consequences.
Second, the process and implementation of effective reform can be
expensive. Frequently, both internal and external sources of financial
support are required. Domestic matching, counterpart funding, or in-
kind contributions of time and resources reflect a positive internal
commitment to reform. Yet, internal sources by themselves are often
insufficient, and reforming communities need to draw on available
funding from the donor community. Understandably, the donor com-
munity requires assurances that money invested in reform is well and
effectively spent. This dynamic frequently poses a "Catch-22" scena-
rio. The host community needs resources and expertise to develop an
implementation strategy worthy of donor funding; however, the donor
community conditions funding on the development of an effective and
credible reform strategy.
Finally, as I pointed out earlier, significant reforms threaten the
vested interests of stakeholders who benefit from the status quo.
Those in support of reform may risk their careers or their personal
safety. Ample security for those working on sensitive reform initia-
tives is rarely, if ever, available.
C. The Internal Reform Challenge
Given these impediments and conditions, reforms frequently fail.
Failures take at least three different forms. First, reforms may merely
render disappointing results. For example, case management reforms
in the United States have not demonstrated any appreciable, multidis-
trict impact on savings of cost or time. 50 Judicial councils aimed at
49. For a superb collection of essays on transplants, adaptation, and legal culture, see ADAPT-
INO LEGAL CULTURES (David Nelken & Johannes Feest eds.. 2001). For an excellent body of
essays on American legal culture in global perspective. see LEGAL CULTURE AND TI-iE LEGAL
PROFESSION (Lawrence M. Friedman & Harry N. Scheiber eds.. 1996).
50. See generally JAMES S. KAKALIK ET Al.. JusT, SPEEDY. AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUA-
TION OF JUDiCIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER TIlE Civii JUS-iiC(F REFORM Aci" (1996).
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improving judicial performance, for example, appear vulnerable to the
same problems they are designed to address: political interference,
corruption, and bureaucratic delay.51 Second, interventions for one
purpose frequently undermine other equally important objectives.
Strong judicial independence measures, such as the "one-roof" reform
in Indonesia, may further insulate the judiciary from anti-corruption
and accountability measures. 52 Efficiency measures, for example, that
integrate alternative dispute resolution may undermine values of pub-
licity because settlements are confidential and normativity because no
judgment is produced to shape the law applicable to others. 53 Finally,
reforms may completely backfire. According to a former Chief Justice
of the Indian Supreme Court, the Court's refusal to allow the execu-
tive branch to play any role in judicial promotions has led to more
interference, not less. 54 Severely repressive anti-corruption measures,
such as in the People's Republic of China, may drive illicit behavior
further underground and enhance those with power and discretion in
those systems to extract rents from those vulnerable to attack.55 Ad-
ditionally, efficiency measures may have a paradoxical effect: by mak-
ing the courts and appended processes more attractive to disputing
parties, reformers may unintentionally attract larger numbers of liti-
gants who would otherwise have settled or lumped their disputes.
51. See, e.g.. Bayelsa CJ Wants National Judicial Council Scrapped, AFR. NEWS SERVICE. May
14, 2001, available at http://www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2001/05/14/20010514news17 (last vis-
ited Sept. 3, 2002) (noting hand-picking of members of judicial council in Nigeria as "absolutely
wrong"). See also UNGAR. supra note 13. at 169 (stating that "Latin America's judicial councils
have already been caught up in party politics, institutional rivalries, and counteraccusations from
the officials being investigated"): LINN HAMMERGREN. Do JUDICIAL COUNCILS FURTHER JUDi-
CIAL REFORM? LESSONS FROM LATIN AMERICA 35 (Carnegie Endowment. Working Paper No.
28, 2002), available at http://www.ceip.org/files/pdf/wp28.pdf (last visited Sept. 3, 2002) (noting
that in many Latin American countries, the judiciary would literally be replaced at the change of
a national administration and. as a result, '[they] came to be staffed by politically compliant
judges of dubious substantive competence and still more questionable ethical proclivities").
52. Under Law number thirty-five of 1999 in Indonesia, the entire administration of the courts
will shift from the Ministry of Justice to the Supreme Court by 2004.
53. For the most influential essay pointing out these weaknesses, see Owen M. Fiss, Against
Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).
54. See Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India. India Supreme Court (1993): V.
VenKatesan. Judiciarv and Social Justice. FRONTLINE. Oct. 14-27. 2000. available at
www.flonnet.com/fl1721/17210960.htm (last visited Nov. 25, 2002) (stating 'Jas the judiciary be-
comes over-protective of its powers vis-a-vis the executive, the nature of its social base causes
concern").
55. See Willy Wo-Lap Lam. China Defends Corruption Claims (Mar. 9. 2002). available at
http://www.cnn.com (last visited Nov. 25, 2002) (reporting that China's top graft-buster disputes
claim that "'the more one fights corruption, the worse it gets").
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Thus, anti-backlog measures may unintentionally create new
backlogs.5 6
These disappointments result in part from the failure to understand
the internal dynamics of the judicial process from the bottom-up. For
example, court reform that does not contemplate the incentive struc-
tures underlying professional behavior is not likely to succeed.5 7 In
India, legislated reforms of the civil procedure code were immediately
suspended by nationwide lawyer strikes because the views, practices,
and interests of the system's key participants were not taken into ac-
count in developing the reform. 58 Comparative research in Europe
has shown that the neglect of taking lawyer compensation schemes
into account may completely undermine civil justice reform aimed at
containing cost or delay.59
Thus, to improve the success rate of judicial reform, reformers face
a daunting internal challenge. Reform efforts must take into account
the deeply embedded causes of the problems they confront, whether
through empathetic accounts or more critical confrontations with the
status quo, the dynamic interplay of problems, or limited resources.
Reform processes must also seek to increase local participation, culti-
vate greater self-awareness, expand the alternative reform arrange-
ments to be considered, adapt them to local conditions, build political
consensus, pursue effective implementation strategies, build experi-
ence, increase investments by showing results, ensure security for
agents of reform, and address the incentive structures for key partici-
pants in the process. Improving the role of external forms of assis-
tance therefore depends heavily on attending to these internal factors.
IV. LIMITS OF EXTERNAL (U.S.) REFORM REMEDIES
The undervaluation of these internal factors often leads to an over-
valuation of the role of external remedies. If local dynamics are ig-
nored, external institutional interventions, methods, models, and
theories tend to raise exaggerated hopes of success. When reforms
56. See George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem. 69 B.U. L. REv.
527 (1989).
57. See. e.g., Stacey Steele. The New Law on Bankruptc
, 
in Indonesia: Towards a Modern
Corporate Bankruptcy Regime. 23 MELi. U. L. REV. 144, 152-60 (1999) (arguing that the reform
of Indonesia's bankruptcy legislation will have little influence on the economic stability of the
nation in the absence of substantive changes to the country's legal culture).
58. See INDIA CODE Cir. PROC. ord. x rule l(a)-(c). § 89 (as amended by Code of Civil Proce-
dure (Amendment) Act (1999)) (directing court to utilize dispute resolution mechanisms, includ-
ing arbitration, conciliation, judicial settlement, and judicial settlement through Iok adalat, or
mediation).
59. See Zuckerman, supra note 24, at 51-52.
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fail, it then becomes easier to blame the disappointment on the inter-
meddling of a foreign or international institution, its coercive meth-
ods, its inapplicable models, or its ideologically-driven theories of
institutional change. These sudden swings of high hopes and deep dis-
appointments would be better moderated by a working presumption
that external remedies are unlikely to overcome internal barriers,
even when they are properly adapted to improve or complement in-
ternal reform commitments and capacities.
The critique of external approaches to justice reform is hardly
novel. 6°1 Many observers have illuminated difficulties encountered in
failures of the "law and development" movement of the 1960s and
1970s.61 Thirty years ago, deeply influenced by this critique, Professor
Franck admonished: "What is needed is help given and taken, with
mutual respect, and without strings, to promising projects, backed by
responsible individuals and institutions. ' 62 Twenty-five years ago,
Professor Merryman effectively summarized these problems in a re-
view of law and development scholarship. He cited four critical weak-
nesses in the export of American legal models to the developing
world: (1) unfamiliarity with the host legal system; (2) the absence of
a respectable theory; (3) immunity from consequences and an artifi-
cial access to power; and (4) a resulting tendency to project and im-
pose U.S. attitudes and ideas. 63 Over ten years ago, Professor Alvarez
revisited these issues, albeit a bit more optimistically, in a thorough
review of "rule of law" programs administered by USAID in the
1980S. 6 4
Most recently, in Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve,65
Thomas Carothers skillfully captured the common features of a di-
verse range of democracy aid projects funded by the U.S. government,
60. For an excellent commentary on the U.S.-based critique of the law and development
movement, see Brian Z. Tamanaha. The Lessons of Law-and- Development Studies. 89 AM. J.
INT'L L. 470 (1995) (book review).
61. See generally Beverly M. Carl. Peanuts, Law Professors and Third World Lawvers. 1986
THIRD WORLD LEGAL SruD. 1: JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAW-
YERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA (1980): David F. Greenberg. Law and Development
in Light of Dependency Theory, 3 RES. L. & Soc. 129 (1980): Gridley Hall & Burton Fretz. Legal
Services in the Third World. 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 782 (1990): David M. Trubek & Marc
Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development
Studies in the United States. 1974 Wis. L. REV. 1062.
62. Thomas M. Franck, The New Development: Can American Law and Legal Institutions
Help Developing Countries?. 1972 Wis. L. REV. 767. 770.
63. See John Henry Merryman. Comparative Law and Social Change. On the Origins. Style,
Decline & Revival of the Law and Development Movement. 25 AM. J. COMP. L. 457, 481 (1977).
64. See Jose E. Alvarez. Promoting the "Rule of Law" in Latin America: Problems and Pros-
pects. 25 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 281 (1991).
65. THOMAS CAROTHERS. AIDING DFMOCRACY ABROAI): THE LEARNING CURVE (1999).
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more specifically USAID. Specifically, he identified several related
problems in the external model, including a lack of humility,66 superfi-
cial assessment,67 simplistic modeling, 68 a misplaced emphasis on ends
rather than process,6 9  and weak evaluative 70  tools 7' and
commitments. 72
Beyond recommendations for more self-criticism, deeper assess-
ments, more sophisticated modeling, an investment in the reform pro-
cess, and a stronger commitment to continued evaluation of aid
projects, all of which reduce the risk of external error, how might ex-
66. Carothers criticizes the lack of self-criticism and expressed awareness of weaknesses in the
U.S. system. He admonishes: "Democracy promoters, however, need to be more conscious of
and more explicitly about the flaws of American democracy, and pay more attention to them in
aid programs." Id. at 63. "These issues should be built into ... programs ... so that others can
anticipate the problems that arise in democratic systems and learn from American efforts, suc-
cessful or not, to address them." Id. at 64.
67. Carothers observes that the external model often inculcates superficial views of problems,
with the tendency of focusing on symptoms instead of deeper pathologies. For example, he
claims that there is a tendency to focus on judicial reform as a purely institutional problem
without addressing deeper power structures that are important determinants. In his discussion
of judicial reform, he notes that the aid community has underestimated several inhibiting factors,
including: the economic incentives of corruption, the decentralized nature of judicial institu-
tions, the independent-mindedness of judicial officials: the limited will to reform: the vulnerabil-
ity of a small group of reformers to removal from positions of power: and resistance to reform by
vested interests of judges and lawyers who may benefit from a dysfunctional system through
their ability to manipulate and get compensated for manipulation of the system. In order to
address these problems, Carothers encourages a more direct confrontation of power and incen-
tive structures that lie beneath the appearances of formal institutional structures. Id. at 163-74.
68. Carothers criticizes the uniformity, U.S.-centricity, and inflexibility of the core model and
strategy for building democracy abroad, including the assumed sequencing of change. He also
observes that there is little borrowing from academic literature. In response, he suggests a
broadening of models to be studied, the use of non-American, regional experts, creativity in the
design of programs, and study of multiple alternatives of reform sequencing. For example, he
advocates greater use of local or regional expertise with more common grounding in the national
context, e.g., Latin American or European experts used in Latin American judicial reform
projects. Id. at 104.
69. Carothers notes the tendency for "endpoints [to] dominate over process." Id. at 93.
70. CAROTHERS. supra note 65, at 93.
71. Carothers points out that many experts are: (1) reluctant to publish and share information:
(2) resistant to deep self-evaluations: and (3) inclined to zealous action rather than self-critical
reflection. Id. at 8-9. This leads to insufficient learning, the frustration of wheel reinvention, and
no middle ground between avid proponents and cynical detractors. Id. at 10.
72. Carothers identifies problems in the evaluation of success and the extent to which aid
enhanced reform, including the specification of criteria, the measurement of satisfaction by qual-
itative and quantitative means, and the identification of key causes. He distinguished three dif-
ferent kinds of evaluation and argued for their specialization: first, the provision of material to
convince others of merits of program: second, the provision of information on effects, weak
spots, room for improvement, and other issues of implementation and development: and finally.
critical engagement in deep learning about aid that questions assumptions. finds new ap-
proaches, and understands how aid projects are perceived and valued. Carothers stresses the
need for beginning with modest expectations. Id. at 281-313.
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ternal approaches to reform be improved to overcome internal barri-
ers to reform and reduce the risks of failure?
In order to assess and improve upon external forms of assistance,
four aspects of any external approach must be distinguished as inde-
pendent variables. A more detailed picture of each variable will
counter the tendency for over-generalization and stereotypical charac-
terizations of a very diverse range of approaches, illustrated by the
following questions. First, which institution is best suited to provide
external assistance? The U.S. State Department (including the former
U.S. Information Agency), USAID, the World Bank, the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, and private foundations (e.g., the Ford Founda-
tion)7 3 each have different levels of experience and expertise in
different types of justice reform. Related to the choice of institution is
the particular mechanism used to encourage reform in a host system.
Conditionality, technical assistance, aid, exchange, or private grants
are each distinctive mechanisms for providing assistance. Second,
what is the particular service that is provided? Computerization,
training, comparative or statistical research, and consulting on reform
designs are each different forms of assistance. Third, which models
are promoted through assistance? Anti-corruption commissions,
court management, case management, alternative dispute resolution,
and new commercial courts each have varied track records in different
national settings. Finally, what is the working theory of institutional
change that informs the reform effort? Approaches based on the ex-
pectation of fast or slow, systemic or incremental, and top-down or
bottom-up reform differ substantially in their underlying theories of
organizational change.
Each of these variables may have an independent impact on the
success of a judicial reform. The institution providing assistance may
be distrusted, lack competence, or use coercive methods that are re-
sented or noncoercive methods that provide no extra incentive to
overcome local barriers. The particular service provided may fail to
answer a local need or skew local determinations of which models
would be most effective as solving institutional problems. The design
itself may be poorly adapted to overcome negative receptivity factors.
Finally, the theory of institutional change may reflect a conventional
wisdom that on further inspection has no impact on local dynamics.
73. See FORD FOUNDATION, MANY ROADS TO JUSTICE: THE LAW-RELATED WORK OF FORD
FOUNDATION GRANTEES AROUND THE WORLD (Mary McClymont & Stephen Golub eds.,
2000), available at http://www.fordfound.org/publications/recent-articles/docs/manyroads.pdf
(last visited Sept. 3, 2002).
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A. Export Processes
1. Institutional Mechanisms
The United States utilizes four different institutional mechanisms
for exporting models of civil justice reform.7 4 First, as an arguably
predominant approach, the United States provides aid or technical as-
sistance to foreign countries engaged in these reforms. The institution
primarily responsible for this approach is USAID;7 5 however, the
State Department and, more indirectly, the World Bank 76 and Inter-
national Monetary Fund (who are both subject to deep American in-
fluence) also utilize this approach. Second, the United States supports
exchange of legal opinion leaders in foreign countries with American
experts. The United States Information Agency, now integrated into
the State Department, is the primary institution of the government
that emphasizes cross-national exchange. Third, the United States,
through the international financial institutions (the World Bank 77 and
International Monetary Fund), provide financial support mainly
through loans to foreign governments, the provision of which funding
is conditional on structural reforms, including legal and institutional
change .7  Finally, the United States supports, mainly through political
access, public grants, and tax credits, the work of private corpora-
tions, 79 foundations, and non-governmental organizations that are in-
terested or dedicated to civil justice reform abroad.
74. See, e.g., Thomas Carothers. The Many Agendas of Rule of Law Reform in Latin America,
in RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA: THE INTERNATIONAL PROMOTION OF JUDICIAL REFORM 4,
7 (Pilar Domingo & Rachel Sieder eds., 2001) [hereinafter RULE OF LAWv IN LATIN AMERICA]
(noting the expansion of the donor country agenda to the broader notion that *the rule of law
generally is critical to democracy").
75. See. e.g.. Margaret Sarles. USAID's Support of Justice Reform in Latin America, in RULE
OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA. supra note 74. at 47 (quantifying over twenty years of aid in
nineteen Latin American countries at a cost of $300 million and total grants of $50 million in
1999).
76. See Ibrahim Shihata. The World Bank, in JUSTICF DELAYED. supra note 4. at 117 (noting
that the assistance is provided "through a number of financial instruments, including adjustment
loans, investment loans, institutional development loans, and diagnostic studies in preparation
for lending activities").
77. See. e.g., Maria Dakolias. Legal and Judicial Reform: I'he Role of Civil Societv in the Re-
form Process, in RULE OF LAW IN LATIN AMERICA. supra note 74. at 80, 97 (emphasizing the
importance of working with "'reform-minded' groups and individuals in civil societv." and not-
ing the expansion of the donor country agenda to the broader notion that "the rule of law gener-
ally is critical to democracy").
78. See, e.g., Francois Gianviti. The Reform of the International Monetary Fund (Conditional-
its and Surveillance). 34 INt'L LAW. 107 (2000) (exploring the interrelationship between reform
bv the Fund and reform of the Fund).
79. There are also other vectors of influence that do not depend on public support. such as
U.S. law firms (and their deep impact on the practice of law) and universities (and their growing
influence on legal education abroad). See Symposium, The Future of the Legal Profession:
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These mechanisms differ in several key respects: the recipient of
funds (U.S. or foreign, public or private organizations), the method of
funding (grant or loan), the ambition of the project (from cultural ex-
change to structural reform), and the level of coercion in the dynamics
between external and internal agents.
To date, reformers do not have the benefit of an independent com-
parative study of these varied approaches: how well, and under what
circumstances, do aid, conditionality, exchange, or privatized forms of
assistance work? This remains a critical weakness in the attempt to
improve upon foreign-assisted reform models.
2. Reform Methods
Independent from the export mechanism, the services provided in
support of reform vary widely. Computerization, training, consulting
in the design and implementation of reform, and the provision of aca-
demic expertise in comparative law or empirical methods are all com-
mon tools of the export trade. Observations of these methods in
active reform projects paint a mixed picture.
a. Computerization
The value of computerization is nearly self-evident. Computeriza-
tion is a powerful tool of information management, central to increas-
ing efficiencies in the administration of the courts and their dockets.
Accountability for case and event tracking, notification systems, filing
systems, and allocations of workload are all enhanced by computeriza-
tion of the courts.80 Singapore, for example, has boasted great
achievements in its computerization efforts.8 ' However, many com-
puterization projects, particularly in poorer countries, have rested on
limited understanding of local practices and needs or human and fi-
nancial resource limitations. Computerization also overshadows sim-
Global Restructuring and the Law: Studies in the Internationalization of Legal Fields and the
Creation of Transnational Arenas, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 407, 423-26 (1994) (discussing the
influence of the Cravath model): Wolfgang Weigand, Americanization of Law: Reception or
Convergence, in LEGAL CULTURE AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION, supra note 49, at 137-40 (noting
the influence of U.S. universities and law firms on Europe, e.g., examinations in Germany, post-
graduate education in the Netherlands, or firm structure, style of legal argument and contract,
etc.).
80. In 1994, Chief Justice Ahmadi of the Indian Supreme Court implemented a comprehen-
sive computerization program for the Supreme Court and reduced the Apex Court's caseload
from 120,000 in October 1994 to 28,000 cases in September 1996. Dr. Abhishek Singhvi, Clear-
ing Arrears: Apex Court on a Fast Track, INDIAN EXPRESS, Jan. 1996.
81. Karen Blochinger, Primus Interpares: Is the Singapore Judiciary First Among Equals?. 9
PA(. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 591, 593 (2000) (stating that "[w]ithin three years . . . the backlog of
thousands of cases was cleared and now cases are being heard within weeks of being filed").
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pler solutions for pressing needs. Many far less expensive services are
capable of achieving efficiencies without the need of computers. For
example, in India, simple case summary forms may allow judges to
quickly determine the time needed for getting a grasp on the matter
before the court. In Angola, according to one of my colleagues, the
courts need string to bind documents together in one file, and the in-
ability to hold large files together wastes valuable court time and
resources.
b. Training
Training, too, is a logical approach to advance changes in procedu-
ral behavior. 82 New codes necessitate more legal education. Procedu-
ral reforms require training in management, alternative forms of
dispute resolution, or oral direct and cross-examination. However,
training also is often divorced from the functional needs of the system
and rarely touches the most central function of all: the act of adjudica-
tion and opinion-writing. Many judicial training centers have ad-
vanced reform through new instruction methods; however, others
remain empty shells of limited value to improvements of the judicial
process.
c. Comparative Method
Judicial reform efforts (e.g., anti-interference, anti-corruption, or
anti-delay) often rely on a comparative theory about which features of
a judicial system cause or alleviate these problems. Comparative the-
ories fall into two frequently overlapping categories. Spatial theories
rely on cross-national comparisons between a reforming country and
one that appears to be performing satisfactorily. Temporal theories
rely on intranational comparisons of the current problems and the an-
ticipated changes and their impacts at a later time. Indeed, reform
proposals necessarily rely on the second type of theory, even if they
are not motivated or guided in any way by cross-national comparisons.
Thus, success of judicial reform is dependent in part on the quality
of the cross-national or intranational comparisons that serve to justify
specific proposals. Elsewhere, I have argued that these comparisons
are often unclear in purpose, skewed in their choice of content, or
imprecise in their tools of differentiation. 83 If the comparisons are
82. See Judge J. Clifford Wallace. Judicial Education and Training in Asia and the Pacific, 21
MICH. J. INT'L L. 849. 849 (2000) (arguing that "[s]uch programs can provide invaluable assis-
tance to the judiciary in its essential role of administering justice and resolving disputes").
83. See generally Hiram E. Chodosh, Comparing Comparisons: In Search of Methodology, 84
IOWA L. REV. 1025, 1067-1127 (t999).
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weak, one might reasonably expect that the reforms upon which they
are based carry a greater margin of error and are less likely to be
successful.
d. Statistical Method
An increasingly common approach to reform is the use of empirical
or statistical methods. On its face, this method makes a significant
contribution to the accuracy in assessing the practical operation of the
system. However, among the several limitations to quantitative meth-
ods, I would like to emphasize one particular propensity here.
Empiricists tend to favor examining phenomena that are easily
measured. Thus, there is a strong tendency to avoid exploring quali-
ties that are difficult to quantify or operationalize. That is, despite the
immediate benefits of the data, the deficiency of complementary,
qualitative assessment often raises more questions than the data can
answer.84 For example, a recent World Bank study in Argentina and
Mexico found far less backlog and delay than previously estimated
due to a great number of cases that were eventually "abandoned. '85
However, the study does not express any evaluation of the merits of
those dropped cases, any diagnosis of why they were dropped (e.g., an
early failure at obtaining injunctive relief, an internalization of the
likelihood of an endless delay, or the depletion of money used to pay
off the registrar to keep the case moving), and the social or economic
effect of their abandonment (non-compliance with contract and prop-
erty rights or increase in the risk and cost of doing business). Not-
withstanding the merits of gathering data to support or refute mere
perception, without a qualitative evaluation, it is far from clear what
to make of these "empirical" findings.
3. Reform Designs
A third independent variable is the design of the reform. Too little
is understood about the impact of specific designs in different contexts
to be confident of a reform's likely success. Take, for example, the
question of judicial independence and accountability.
84. See HAMMERGREN. supra note 29 (stating that "judicial reform must be built on a solid
empirical base").
85. Id. "In both countries a large portion of cases were considered 'abandoned' (unresolved).
Such cases are technically open, but their files indicate that the parties are no longer pursuing
them, whether because of an unrecorded settlement, frustration, or some other reason." Id.
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Measures that advance independence do so in relative, not absolute,
ways. 86 To what extent does a life tenure system enhance indepen-
dence? Judges with tenure may not lose their jobs, but they may be
deprived of resources, such as salary or administrative budget, subject
to discipline or removal, or vulnerable to public pressure through po-
litical statements or media attention. That is, a life tenure system does
not in itself guarantee full, or even sufficient, judicial independence.
To what extent does an external disciplinary system enhance account-
ability? External systems may have limited resources, limited access
to information, or limited protection from corruption in their own
midst. That is, an external disciplinary system by itself is no guaranty
for establishing full or even partial accountability. The net result of
any reform measure is an empirical question, about which we know
much too little, that if we knew more would render answers in quan-
tifiably relative, rather than in absolute, terms. The question of how
to design a sufficiently independent and accountable judiciary renders
a wide range of institutional responses. Therefore, there is rarely a
clear answer in response to questions about the most appropriate re-
form design.
Despite these questions about the relationships between a particu-
lar model and its probability of success, U.S. civil justice system fea-
tures are intensely promoted. These features fall roughly into
categories of greater and lesser interest, and three factors appear to
influence the different levels of demand: what the United States pro-
motes, what foreign reformers view as successful, and what appears
best to answer local needs.
a. Features of Greater Interest
Beyond constitutional features, particularly the ideal of judicial in-
dependence and its more affirmative conception as judicial review 87 or
the generally perceived processes of the Americanization of European
legal culture,88 U.S. civil justice reform features of greatest interest
86. Charles Gardner Geyh. Customary Independence, in JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT THE
CROSSROADS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 161 (Stephen B. Burbank & Barry Friedman
eds., 2002) (stating that -[the] critical inquiry thus becomes, how much of each? Where should
independence end and accountability begin?").
87. See generallv 2 JUDICIAL REVIEW IN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE: LINER AMICORUM IN
HONOUR OF LORD SLYNN Oi HADLEY (Mads Andenas ed.. 2000): Martin Shapiro, The "Global-
ization" of Judicial Review, in LEGAL CULTURE AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION. supra note 49, at
119-20 (evaluating the 'global vogue in American-style. constitutional, judicial review"): id. at
131 (stating "if we mean by globalization the spread to Europe").
88. Weigand. supra note 79. at 137, 140-41 (noting the influence of American institutions on
civil procedure in Europe (e.g.. arbitration, bankruptcy. constitutional law, and other areas of
substantive law)).
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abroad include a wide range of anti-delay reforms, from court8 9 and
case management9" to alternative dispute resolution. 91 Court manage-
ment systems promise efficiencies in the back-office management of
the system and the information flows intersecting with the legal pro-
cess, including case and event tracking systems and sophisticated cal-
endar systems for the allocation of judicial resources and for
continued self-study and evaluation.
Case management is attractive for the discipline it offers in judicial
control over the lawyers and the parties they represent. The export of
case management to countries in continental Europe or former colo-
nies with "civil law" models meets much less resistance than it does in
Anglo-American systems. The stronger tradition of judicial control,
coupled with the incapacity in many systems of the judiciary to exert
that control, makes case management a particularly attractive
export. 92
Finally, alternative dispute resolution, which includes arbitration,
mediation, conciliation, judicial settlement, and other hybrid forms
are also extremely popular. Many see these alternatives to trial as not
only faster and cheaper, but also potentially superior forms of dispute
settlement that privatize the state's monopoly on dispute resolution.
Many countries can easily find social or pre-colonial analogues to
modern mediation as a source of legitimacy for what would otherwise
be viewed as a foreign export. However, many of the concerns of U.S.
experts about these interventions are echoed abroad. Judges and law-
yers worry about the lack of publicity, transparency, and normativity
of these processes, as well as their potential corruptibility.
Again, here, we might ask why these are of greater interest. Three
explanations spring to mind. First, these strategies have been heavily
promoted by USAID in its projects abroad. Second, many perceive,
somewhat too favorably, that these interventions have been uniformly
successful in the United States in creating greater efficiency and access
to justice. Third, and most importantly, the primary interest in these
89. See generally Ivan Lavados Montes & Juan Enrique Vargas Viancos, Judicial Management,
in JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 17-32 (Carlos
Cordovez ed., 1993).
90. See, e.g., Justice Carlos Mario Vellosa, Judicial Management Information Systems, in JUI)I-
CIAL CHALLENGES IN THE NEW MILLENIUM. supra note 5, at 35-36.
91. For a survey of these trends (outside the Latin American and Caribbean regions). see
John Linarelli & Carolyn Herzog. Model Practices in Judicial Reform: A Report on Experiences
Outside the Region. in JUSTICE BEYOND OUR BORDERS: JUDICIAL REFORMS FOR LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN 1-52 (Christina Biebesheimer & Francisco Mejfa eds., 2000).
92. See Hiram E. Chodosh et al.. Egyptian Civil Justice Process Modernization: A Functional
and Systemic Approach, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 865, 913-14 (1996) (emphasizing the ways in which
case management and judicial mediation address critical needs in Egyptian judicial reform).
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techniques stems from local perceptions of the extent to which they
address local needs.
b. Features of Lesser Interest
It would be easy to reach the conclusion that the foregoing evidence
of U.S. influence establishes an affirmative answer to the central ques-
tion raised by this panel. That would be premature and inaccurate,
however, without scanning other U.S. features of lesser interest or
relevance.
Two features stand out in this category: the U.S. jury and discovery
systems. 93 Both are considered anathema to civil justice in most coun-
tries. Objections to the jury system run long and deep: the opaque
nature of jury decisions, the quality and qualifications of the decision-
maker, the dramatic tactics thought to persuade jurors, or the propen-
sity for legal nullification. Also, as I am sure Professor Subrin will
explicate (far more ably than I), U.S. discovery is viewed with even
more disdain: the lack of privacy protections for litigants, the exten-
sive breadth of information sought, the lack of active judicial over-
sight, the impact of uneven financial resources, the duplication of
evidentiary process with that of the trial, or the sheer cost. Most for-
eign observers consider this a fishing expedition in which the mode of
capture is to drain all of the water from the fishing pond.
Notwithstanding the force of these generalizations, there are two
important qualifications. Although the jury system is of no interest,
the continuous trial is increasingly regarded as a key to eliminate the
adjournment culture that is so common throughout the world. Sec-
ond, although practically no one wishes to adopt the U.S. discovery
model, out-of-court evidence taking is attractive to judicial reformers
who appreciate the inability of courts to gather, file, store, and re-
trieve evidence with efficiency and the impracticality of forcing parties
to come to the courts (sometimes at great expense from long dis-
tances) to submit or take evidence.
Again, one may understand this lack of interest in the jury and dis-
covery systems in three ways. First, the United States does not pro-
mote these as reforms worthy of adaptation to other systems. Second,
neither of these two features, with the exception of the qualifications I
noted, appears to be successful in the views of foreign reformers.
Third, there is no perceived pressing local need that either model
would address. Very few countries utilize a jury system, though quite
a few more use lay assessors in one way or another. Very few coun-
93. Punitive damage doctrines provide a prominent third example.
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tries allow any form of private discovery. Thus, these are of limited
interest.
Additionally, it is important to appreciate that many national civil
justice systems are pursuing reforms that are not based primarily on
U.S. models. For example, judicial training or human resource pro-
grams for a permanent, career judiciary94 may find little in the United
States to draw upon. Surely, the Federal Judicial Center and the Na-
tional and State Judicial Colleges have much to offer, but foreign re-
formers must go to each of these institutions to piece together what is
often unified in many other countries. Additionally, judicial commis-
sions and councils are popular in many national communities. 95 In-
stead of one model institution, the United States offers a wide range
of different institutions with different functions that might all fall
under one judicial commission model (e.g., the California Commission
on Judicial Performance, the Federal Judicial Conference and Circuit
Councils of the Administrative Office of the Courts.) The fragmented
nature of these models, from a foreign perspective, renders these U.S.
institutions more difficult to promote or adapt.
4. Reform Theories
One presumption necessary to export reform theories posits that
U.S. models are easily importable or transplantable with a comparable
level of success. This suggests that reform occurs with the mere intro-
duction of a foreign model.
What, if anything, is wrong with this presumption'? Skepticism is
justified for at least four reasons. First, the level of success achieved
by the civil justice system within the United States is far from clear.
Second, reports of successful receptions of U.S. models are scarce and
failures are widely cited. 96 Third, the profound uniqueness of the U.S.
system (judicial selection, private discovery, the aggressive use of Al-
ternative Dispute Resolution (ADR), high settlement rates, the cost,
the adversarial use of experts., and the jury system) should caution
reformers that one feature's success in a U.S. context may not work as
well within a different set of dynamic interactions of features. For
94. See, e.g.. Discussion on "Autonomy and Budgetarv Independence and Education in lbero-
America," in JUDICIAL CHALLENGES IN THE NEW MILLENIUM, supra note 5, at 27-33.
95. See Hector Fix-Zamudio, Bodies that Govern and Administer the Judicial Branch of Gov-
ernment in Latin America. in JUSTICE AND DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIB-
BEAN, supra note 89, at 39-60 (discussing the introduction of judicial councils in Latin America).
96. See, e.g.. Yves Dezalay & Bryant Garth. The Import and Export of Law and Legal Institu-
tions: International Strategies in National Palace Wars, in ADAPTINci LEGAL CUILTURES, supra
note 49. at 241, 245 (stating that "Ji]t is fair to suggest that neither the independence nor the
efficiency of the courts, according to most observers so far. has improved significantly").
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example, many U.S. judges express the view that the jury system en-
hances judicial independence by providing a political cushion against
public reactions to verdicts they view as unjust. Absent a jury system,
therefore, the combination of features necessary to achieve an appro-
priate balance between independence and accountability may differ
significantly.
Finally, as suggested above, this view is often supported by embed-
ded theories of institutional change. These theories frequently under-
estimate the resilience of local impediments to change (recalcitrant
judges, lawyers and their fee mechanisms, political resistance to
strengthening the courts, deeply embedded corrupt practices, the ab-
sence of human and financial resources, and the priority of other so-
cial, economic, and political problems). Yet, whether to approach
these problems from the top-down or bottom-up, with speed or pa-
tience, incrementally or systemically, remain open questions.
Every approach to civil justice change abroad carries this kind of
theory for why a project is carried out and how it is expected to en-
hance the likelihood of success. Unfortunately, these embedded theo-
ries are rarely expressed and even less frequently examined.
Explication of these mechanisms and methods is extremely important
in the development of methodologies that would allow us to articulate
rationales for the acceptance or rejection of different reform methods
or models. 97
B. The External Reform Challenge
In order to change justice reform abroad, new light must be shed on
the wide variety of export institutional mechanisms, methods, models,
and theories in support of civil justice reform. The first step in this
process is to raise the issues that are upstaged by pollyannic reformers
or cynical detractors.
Which is a more effective institutional mechanism: conditionality,
technical assistance, exchange, private grants, or interaction?
Which institutions and procedures are more likely to satisfy design
goals of independence and accountability, impartiality and integrity,
or efficiency and justice in different systemic contexts?
Which services or methods of reform design are most likely to lead
to positive outcomes? Where should resources be invested? How im-
portant is computerization compared to string? How important is
97. See Chodosh, supra note 83, at 1039 (stating that "[wlithout a methodology, decision mak-
ers and commentators have no set of available justifications for the acceptance or rejection- of a
particular approach or decision).
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training in case management compared to the act of adjudication?
Which should come first: empirical research or reform experimenta-
tion? How should that empirical research be developed: through sur-
vey, quantitative statistics, or qualitative observation? How should
reform experiments be attempted: through pilot programs, and if so,
how will they be delimited? Which comparison is more important: a
cross-national comparison with a successfully reformed country or an
intranational comparison of the status quo with the proposed
changes?
Which theories of institutional reform are more sound? To what
extent should the reforms be sequenced gradually98 or aggressively
pursued on a comprehensive basis? 99 Will reform begin from the top-
down or the bottom-up? How will political strategies be developed to
align political support among elites and participants in the judicial
system?
The absence of ready answers should not suppress attention to
these pressing questions. A continued evaluation of the alternative
responses, their theoretical justifications, and evidentiary support is
critical to maximizing the positive impact, and minimizing the poten-
tial harm, of external forms of assistance.
V. CONCLUSION: REFORMING REFORM
A. Responsive Strategies
The critical evaluation of the impediments to civil justice reform
and the limitations of externally driven U.S. projects to advance civil
justice reform, particularly in countries of profound need, may lead to
some potentially reconstructive strategies.
Accordingly, in this brief conclusion, I would like to restate the is-
sues raised above as an outline of a dozen strategies that might im-
98. See NORTH, supra note 30, at 6 (stating that "institutions typically change incrementally
rather than in discontinuous fashion"). Id. at 89 (stating institutional change is "overwhelmingly
incremental"). Incrementalism is itself often seen as a political strategy in the face of strong
opposition. See, e.g., BUSCAGLIA ET AL., supra note 4, at 21 (stating that "[r]eforms that seem
threatening to those in power should be undertaken in stages"). See also SOLOMON & FOGLE-
SONO. supra note 23. at 177 (advocating "a moderate reform agenda." differing from more radi-
cal and minimal approaches to reform that focuses on "building and improvement of courts and
legal practices rather than their transformation"); MARIA DAKOLIAS & JAVIER SAD,. THE
WORLD BANK, JUDICIAL REFORM: A PROCESS OF CHANGE THROUGH PILOT COURTS 2-3 (1999),
available at http://www4.worldbank.org/legal/publications/Judicial Reform-72.pdf (last visited
Sept. 3, 2002) (arguing that pilot project alleviate barriers of inexperience in reform, allow for
more focused testing, and help to build consensus).
99. See PRILLAMAN, supra, note 6, at 137-61 (discussing that in Chile's encouraging (though
tentative) success, the pace of reform was gradual. but the scope and breadth were
comprehensive).
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prove the success rate of civil justice reform abroad promoted or
inspired by U.S. institutions or models:
(1) Focus on institutions and their performance in pursuit of articu-
lated values;
(2) Recognize the critical importance and fragility of courts (or their
functional equivalent);
(3) Respond to the urgency of bridging the gap between stated civil
justice commitments and the failure to realize them;
(4) Understand the internal, underlying causes of court failure and
take them heavily into account in reform initiatives;
(5) Address the internal impediments to reform, including the:
(a) benefits of institutional failure;
(b) powerful interests in support of the status quo;
(c) mutually reinforcing effects of underlying problems; and
(d) impact of institutional failure on financial and human
resources;
(6) Improve local capacity for reform within host community, includ-
ing increases in the:
(a) level of local participation in the design and process of
reform;1 00
(b) candor and self-awareness in assessment of the problems;
(c) openness to a wide variety of reform approaches;
(d) creativity in adapting models (foreign or imagined) to local
circumstances;o 1
100. Participation may be seen as both an end in itself and a principal means of developing
responsive reforms. See SEN, supra note 7, at 36 (emphasizing both a constitutive and instru-
mental role of expanding freedom in development).
101. Creative comparative approaches to design would not rely entirely on eristing foreign
systems: they would attempt to massage and tweak features in ways that may not have been tried
in the past. Adaptation includes the fusion of foreign or other imagined models with domestic
institutions and processes to produce a well-tailored reform designed to address current and
local needs. Reforms in which I have been involved, including Egyptian mediation of disputes
against the government, are heavily adapted. See Law No. 7 of 2000, Concerning The Establish-
ment Of Conciliation Committees in Certain Litigations To Which The Ministries And Juridical
Persons Are Parties. OFFICIAL J. No. 13 bis (Apr. 4, 2000) (Egypt): Prime Minister's Decree No.
1193 of 2000, Concerning The Establishment Of Harmonization Committees in Certain Disputes
Where The Ministries And Juridical Persons Are Parties Thereto, OFFICIAL J. No. 22 (June 1,
2000) (Egypt) (establishing mandatory mediation before panels of retired judges in all cases
brought against the government). Israeli case management systems of central judges who con-
trol the docket are also unique. Within less than two years. the Tel Aviv trial courts have used
this adaptation to eliminate (almost entirely) a backlog of over 17,000 cases filed from 1988-
1994. A study of this reform is forthcoming next year. See INST. FOR STUDY & DEv. OF LEG.
SYS., PHASE FOUR REPORT: ISRAELI (2002 LEGAL STUDY) (on file with author). Even successful
reforms raise issues that must be continually addressed, and a creative intellectual capacity is an
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(e) consensus-building and its alignment with the views of po-
litical elites; 10 2 and
(f) financial investments in the process of reform design and
consensus-building and security protections for reformers;
(7) Anticipate the likelihood of reform failure by thinking through
likely systemic outcomes of reform interventions;
(8) Evaluate and choose among independent variables in the structure
of a reform initiative, including choices of institutional mechanism,
method, design, and theory of reform, according to the needs and as-
pirations of host system;
(9) Address the weaknesses of purely internal or external reform ap-
proaches by developing more collaborative institutional frameworks
in order to supply (modest and carefully calibrated) foreign assistance
only when necessary to bolster internal capacities (mentioned in
(6)); 103
(10) Broaden the comparative approach beyond the U.S. to include a
wider variety and greater number of national experiences (particularly
within the region or at the same level in economic development of the
reforming country) and hypothetical reform models designed to
broaden the available alternatives under consideration;
(11) Recognize the utility (and limits) of statistics and other comple-
mentary research methods to broaden the comparative informational
basis for reform; and
(12) Appreciate that each decision in the process of reform will be in
part a choice of unsatisfactory alternatives, that is, dilemmas of
method and design determinations.1 0 4
important tool in sustaining success. Thus, it is useful to inculcate creativity in order to broaden
the potential alternatives to be considered.
102. Reforms are more likely to be successful if political support from above and below can
be developed and aligned before implementation. Effective implementation depends on the
receptivity of the primary actors in the legal community. Thus, building a bottom-up consensus
among judges and lawyers on the substance and process of reform enhances the likelihood of
implementation. However. effective implementation also relies heavily on political support at
the highest levels of public decision-making. Therefore, the probability of effective implementa-
tion increases if reform designs cultivated through consensus from the bottom-up are consistent
with top-down policy determinations.
103. For a description of these more collaborative approaches, see Chodosh et al., supra note
27, at 19 (stressing the joint involvement of local and foreign experts).
104. Strategies developed to emerge through these dilemmas are first proposed in Hiram E.
Chodosh. Emergence From the Dilemmas of Justice Reform, 38 TEX. INT'L L.J. (forthcoming
2003).
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B. From Method to Methodology
To make this a baker's dozen, I would like to add one last recom-
mendation that is arguably more important than any of the others.
Reformers and academics cannot be sure of the success of any par-
ticular mechanism or model in civil justice reform, including those in-
spired by the particular features of the U.S. system. Nonetheless, we
can inform the process of reform by identifying, evaluating, and at-
tempting to improve upon these methods. In that sense, our most
fruitful contribution to reform may rest in our ability to develop meth-
odologies that are capable of articulating rationales for the acceptance
or rejection of different methods. 0 5
The notion of methodology causes us to ask what strategies are be-
ing employed and exposes them for critical evaluation. Ultimately,
this form of comparative evaluation may help us to develop"in the
longer run a positive feedback system for distinguishing better ap-
proaches to reform in different contexts.
In this final sense, a methodology for improving the available ap-
proaches may help to bolster both the theory and practice of justice
reform. Given the critical contemporary need for improving judicial
performance worldwide and the impediments confronting reformers
engaged in that project, a collaborative intellectual investment in ex-
ploring the nature of these problems and the effective ways of ap-
proaching them is well worth the trouble.
105. See HIRAM E. CHODOSH. GLOBAL JUSTIi(L REFORM: A COMPARATIVE METHODOL OY
(forthcoming NYU Press).
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